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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Among the various issues appellant Prince Isaac raises 
in his challenge to his conviction and sentence is one that 
requires us to consider once again the parameters of a 
criminal defendant‟s right to represent himself.  Prince Isaac 
was convicted by a jury of fifteen counts arising out of his 
role as the organizer of a drug trafficking ring in Lancaster, 
Pennsylvania.  Isaac contends that he was denied the right to 
represent himself when he did not attend two sidebar 
conferences concerning jury instructions and that the District 
Court erroneously instructed the jury as to the continuing 
criminal enterprise (“CCE”) count, which carried a life 
3 
 
sentence.  Isaac also contends that the District Court made 
several sentencing errors.  We address each argument in turn.
1
  
 
I.  
 
On April 5, 2009, a grand jury issued a Second 
Superseding Indictment charging Isaac with 25 counts.  At 
trial, the Government introduced evidence that Isaac and his 
half-brother Shamek Hynson founded, organized, and 
controlled a drug trafficking organization in Lancaster, 
Pennsylvania.  Isaac and Hynson employed several others to 
help package and sell crack cocaine and heroin.  As part of 
this organization, Isaac used straw purchasers to obtain guns, 
which he later sold.  Guns were also used to protect the 
operation.  The Government offered testimony of several 
coconspirators linking Isaac to several specific cocaine and 
heroin transactions.  Based on this evidence, Isaac was 
ultimately convicted of fifteen of the charged counts.
2
  
 
Each count and the corresponding sentence are as 
follows:  life imprisonment for engaging in a CCE in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848 (count 2), 360 months on each of 
four counts of distribution of heroin and/or crack in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (counts 3, 6, 9 and 11), 
120 months on each of four counts of distribution of crack in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) (counts 5, 7, 
8, and 10), 480 months for employment of a minor to 
distribute drugs in violation of  21 U.S.C. § 861 (count 12), 
480 months for distribution of crack within 1000 feet of a 
public park in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) (count 14), 240 
months on each of two counts of tampering with a witness in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) & (2) (counts 23 and 24),  
and a 10 year mandatory minimum consecutive sentence for 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
2
 The jury originally convicted Isaac of 19 counts.  Four 
counts were set aside by the District Court following Isaac‟s 
motion for judgment of acquittal.   
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possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug distribution in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) (count 17).  All sentences were 
to run concurrently with the CCE life imprisonment count 
with the exception of count 17, possession of a firearm, which 
by statute must run consecutively to the life imprisonment.
3
  
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). 
 
In reviewing the panoply of challenges raised by the 
defendant, many of which coalesce into the claim that a life 
sentence is a draconian penalty to impose on a young man 
who embarked on his criminal activity when he was 15 years 
old, it is necessary to keep in mind that Isaac formed and led 
a violent organization that spewed guns, heroin and crack 
onto the streets of Lancaster for years, shooting and 
intimidating the population as members of the organization 
proceeded through one criminal activity after another.  We 
are not unaware that the sentence imposed was significant, 
particularly in light of Isaac‟s youth—Isaac was just twenty to 
twenty-one years old at the time of the offense conduct and 
twenty-four years old at sentencing.
4
  Thus, as we customarily 
do, we treat each of Isaac‟s arguments on appeal with great 
attention.   
 
II. 
 
A. Sixth Amendment Right to Self-Representation 
 
Isaac contends that his Sixth Amendment right to self-
representation was violated when, while proceeding pro se, he 
was not present at two sidebar conferences held during the 
jury charge.  Isaac was represented by counsel until the close 
of the Government‟s case on the eighth day of trial when, 
                                              
3
 Although Isaac was convicted of conspiracy to distribute 
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 826 (count 1), no sentence 
was imposed because Isaac was also convicted of CCE (count 
2).   
 
4
 As the Government described it at argument, the 
sentence in this case was “very, very severe.”  Oral Argument 
at 35:10.   
5 
 
after a lengthy colloquy with the District Judge, Isaac 
knowingly waived his right to counsel.  Isaac‟s appointed trial 
counsel, Attorney Geoffrey Seay, was then appointed standby 
counsel.  Isaac chose not to provide any evidence in his 
defense, and therefore represented himself only during 
closing and at sentencing.  Ostensibly for security reasons, 
Isaac was not permitted to move about the courtroom during 
closing, although he was permitted to stand at his desk.  
Subsequently, a charging conference was held at which Isaac 
was permitted to and indeed did raise objections to the 
proposed charge, none of which are relevant on appeal.  
Thereafter, the Judge delivered the charge to the jury.   
 
At the close of the instructions, the Judge asked the 
attorneys, including both Isaac and his standby counsel by 
name, whether there was anything they wanted to discuss at 
sidebar regarding the charge.  Isaac did not indicate that he 
had an objection, but the prosecutor did.   A sidebar was held.  
Attorney Seay attended, Isaac did not, but Isaac did not object 
to this arrangement.  After the sidebar, the Judge gave a 
limiting instruction, directing the jury to consider testimony 
regarding Isaac‟s alleged possession of a firearm only for the 
purpose of determining whether the acts were in furtherance 
of the alleged conspiracy—and not for any other purpose.  
The Judge also reiterated the CCE charge.  The Judge then 
held another brief sidebar, where nothing of substance was 
discussed, and then dismissed the jury for deliberations.   
 
Based on these facts, Isaac contends that his inability 
to participate in the two sidebar conferences violated his right 
to self-representation.  It is well settled that the Sixth 
Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to 
proceed pro se equal to its guarantee of the right to counsel.  
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975).  In order for 
the right to self-representation to be effective, that “right must 
impose some limits on the extent of standby counsel‟s 
unsolicited participation.”  McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 
168, 177 (1984).  The Supreme Court has identified two 
principal limitations.  “First, the pro se defendant is entitled 
to preserve actual control over the case he chooses to present 
to the jury. . . . Second, participation by standby counsel 
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without the defendant‟s consent should not be allowed to 
destroy the jury‟s perception that the defendant is 
representing himself.”  Id. at 178.  The Supreme Court has 
cautioned that “[i]n measuring standby counsel‟s involvement 
against [these standards], it is important not to lose sight of 
the defendant‟s own conduct.  A defendant can waive his 
Faretta rights.  Participation by counsel with a pro se 
defendant‟s express approval is, of course, constitutionally 
unobjectionable. . . . [A] pro se defendant‟s solicitation of or 
acquiescence in certain types of participation by counsel 
substantially undermines later protestations that counsel 
interfered unacceptably.”  Id. at 182.   
 
Other circuits have applied these principles in cases 
where standby counsel participates at sidebar in lieu of the 
pro se defendant.  In Lefevre v. Cain, 586 F.3d 349, 355 (5th 
Cir. 2009), the Fifth Circuit held that when a pro se 
defendant, who was shackled behind the desk, failed to object 
to standby counsel‟s participation in several sidebar 
conferences, there was no Faretta violation because the 
defendant acquiesced in standby counsel‟s participation in 
lieu of the defendant‟s own.  The court reasoned that because 
the defendant “had the opportunity to object to his exclusion, 
his absence from the bench conferences was not involuntary.”  
Id.  Similarly, in United States v. Mills, 895 F.2d 897, 904 (2d 
Cir. 1990), the Second Circuit held that there was no 
substantial violation of Faretta in excluding the pro se 
defendant from the sidebar conferences before he voiced any 
objection to the procedure.  We take guidance from these 
cases.
 5
   
                                              
5
 Conversely, we find the Tenth Circuit‟s decision in 
United States v. McDermott, 64 F.3d 1448 (10th Cir. 1995), 
easily distinguishable.  There, the District Court flatly forbade 
the defendant from participating in bench conferences without 
citing any security concerns for doing so.  Id. at 1451-52.  In 
the end, McDermott was barred from attending thirty bench 
conferences.  Id. at 1452.  The Ninth Circuit‟s holding in 
Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 744 (9th Cir. 2008), is also 
inapposite because in that case the defendant had no 
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Isaac contends that the earlier court-imposed limitation 
on his movement during his closing implicitly prevented or 
forbade him from attending the sidebar.  This assertion is 
belied by the record.  As noted, the Judge specifically asked 
Isaac by name if there was anything he wanted to discuss.  
Isaac raised no objection and acquiesced to standby counsel‟s 
participation in the conferences.  Accordingly, Isaac waived 
his right to participate in the sidebar conferences; his 
constitutional right to proceed pro se was preserved.   
 
 
B. CCE Jury Instruction 
 
Isaac contends that the CCE jury instruction was 
erroneous.  The defendant failed to object to the instruction 
and, thus, a new trial can only be granted if the mistake  
constituted plain error.  See United States v. Gambone, 314 
F.3d 163, 182 (3d Cir. 2003).  “[T]he relevant [plain error] 
inquiry . . . is whether, in light of the evidence presented at 
trial, the failure to instruct had a prejudicial impact on the 
jury‟s deliberations.”  United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 
1287 (3d Cir. 1993) (quotations omitted).  An errant 
instruction constitutes plain error only if it produced a 
miscarriage of justice; that is, if the error “seriously affect[ed] 
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.”  Id. (quotations omitted).   
 
In order to be convicted of CCE, a person must (1) be 
found to have violated a federal drug distribution felony, and 
(2) such violation must have been part of a continuing series 
of drug violations, which (A) was undertaken with five or 
more other persons whom the defendant organized, 
supervised, or managed, and (B) from which the defendant 
obtained substantial income or resources.  21 U.S.C. § 848(c).   
 
Here, Isaac contends and the Government concedes 
that the District Court erred when instructing the jury as to 
                                                                                                     
opportunity to object to his exclusion from a chambers 
conference.   
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which other counts would satisfy the first CCE element, 
violation of an underlying federal drug distribution felony.  
On several occasions, the District Court instructed that the 
underlying offenses charged in “Counts 1, 3, Counts 5 
through 12 and Counts 14 through 17” would satisfy the 
predicate offense requirement for the CCE count.  App. at 
207.  This was error.  Counts 15 through 17 should not have 
been included in the instruction because Isaac was not 
charged in count 15 and counts 16 and 17 were both Section 
924(c) firearm offenses which cannot serve as predicate drug 
violations for a CCE offense.   
 
Our inquiry therefore is whether this error affected the 
integrity or result of the proceeding.  In order to convict the 
defendant for CCE, the jury was only required to find that the 
defendant committed one of the predicate drug distribution 
offenses.  The instructions made that clear.  The jury did not 
limit its finding of guilt on the CCE count to specific 
predicate offenses.  Instead, the jury found the defendant 
guilty of all nine drug distribution counts, easily satisfying the 
requirement and ensuring that there was no prejudicial 
impact. 
   
Beyond that, the District Court made clear that the 
CCE conviction was contingent upon the jury‟s finding that 
Isaac engaged in a series of drug trafficking transactions.  The 
Court initially stated that “[i]n effect, the Government has 
charged that the defendant has engaged in the business of 
trafficking in prohibited drugs on a continuing series -- 
serious, widespread supervisor and substantial basis.”  App. at 
205.  Moreover, the Court summarized the first element by 
instructing that the jury must find that “the defendant 
committed any of the offenses of conspiring to distribute 
controlled substances or distribution of controlled 
substances.”  App. at 206.  That instruction necessarily 
excludes counts 15 to 17, which either do not involve the 
defendant or do not involve distribution.  Accordingly, 
despite the erroneous references to counts 15 through 17, the 
charge as a whole made it clear that the CCE count was 
premised on an underlying drug distribution offense.  The 
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error caused no prejudice and is not reversible under plain 
error review. 
   
C. Failure to File § 851 Notice 
 
As outlined above, the District Court imposed 360 
month concurrent sentences on each of counts 3, 6, 9, and 
11—all drug distribution counts for violations of 21 U.S.C. § 
841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).  Typically, the statutory maximum 
for each such conviction is 20 years, or 240 months.  21 
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).  However, an enhanced statutory 
maximum of 30 years exists when the defendant has 
committed “a violation after a prior conviction for a felony 
drug offense has become final.”  Id.  But this enhanced 30 
year maximum is only available if, before trial, the 
Government “files an information with the court (and serves a 
copy of such information on the person or counsel for the 
person) stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied 
upon.”  21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1).   
 
The Government concedes that no such information 
was filed and docketed and “thus [it] did not comply with the 
statutory requirements.”  Appellee‟s Br. at 53.  Nevertheless, 
the Government contends that because Isaac did not object to 
the sentence, the Government‟s neglect should be reviewed 
for plain error.  Several other circuits have held that plain 
error applies when a defendant fails to object to the lack of a 
§ 851 notice because the notice requirement is not 
jurisdictional, but merely procedural.  See United States v. 
Lewis, 597 F.3d 1345, 1347 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Beasley, 495 F.3d 142, 146 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Dodson, 288 F.3d 153, 161 (5th Cir. 2002).
6
     
 
                                              
6
 In a non-precedential opinion, this court held similarly.  
United States v. Johnson, 93 F. App‟x 416, 419-20 (3d Cir. 
2004).  However, under our Internal Operating Procedures 
only precedential opinions are binding on the court.  3d Cir. 
I.O.P. 5.7; 9.1.   
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Other courts, including our own, have held that the § 
851(a) notice requirement is jurisdictional, and thus cannot be 
procedurally defaulted by a failure to object.  See United 
States v. Harris, 149 F.3d 1304, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998) (courts 
lack jurisdiction to enhance a sentence unless the Government 
strictly complies with § 851‟s filing requirement); United 
States v. Allen, 566 F.2d 1193, 1196 (3d Cir. 1977) (failure to 
comply with § 851 pretrial filing requirement is a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to enhancement).  See also United 
States v. Baugham, 613 F.3d 291, 296 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(noting that “[t]o penalize a defendant for not alerting the 
district court to its failure to alert him would pervert the 
statute and get it exactly backward”); United States v. 
Severino, 316 F.3d 939, 952 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“§ 851(a) is not merely a procedural 
statute, the violation of which might lend itself to an 
examination under a plain error analysis”).  Under this view, 
absent compliance with § 851, a sentencing court lacks 
authority to impose the enhancement and therefore plain error 
review is not the appropriate standard.   
 
The Second Circuit has sidestepped the issue of 
whether plain error review should apply if the defendant fails 
to object to § 851 deficiencies.  United States v. Espinal, 634 
F.3d 655, 665 n.7 (2d Cir. 2011).  We will do the same.  We 
need not definitively decide whether plain error review 
should apply when a defendant neglects to object to the 
Government‟s failure to file a § 851 information because even 
assuming the more stringent plain error review applies, we 
find that the error was plain in this case.
7
   
 
Under plain error review, a defendant will only prevail 
if there was an error that was both clear and affected the 
defendant‟s substantial rights, that is, it affected the outcome 
of the proceedings.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Puckett v. United 
                                              
7
 We are particularly hesitant to definitively decide one 
way or another whether plain error applies because defense 
counsel does not brief the issue, depriving us of the benefits 
accompanying an adversarial response. 
   
11 
 
States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2009).  If those requirements 
are met, the court of appeals has the discretion to remedy the 
error if “the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Puckett, 129 S. Ct. 
at 1429 (internal quotations and alterations omitted).   
 
One of the primary purposes of the § 851 notice 
requirement is to inform the defendant that the Government 
intends to seek an enhancement before the defendant decides 
whether to enter a guilty plea or go to trial so that the 
defendant can make an informed decision as to his or her 
option.  Lewis, 597 F.3d at 1347; Beasley, 495 F.3d at 149; 
Dodson, 288 F.3d at 159-60.
8
  Accordingly, courts that have 
applied the plain error standard to § 851 have focused on 
whether there was actual notice.  These courts have held that 
the failure to file a § 851 notice does not prejudice the 
defendant‟s substantial rights when the defendant had actual 
notice of the Government‟s intent to seek an enhancement 
prior to the decision to go to trial or plead.  Lewis, 597 F.3d at 
1347; Johnson, 93 F. App‟x at 419-20.  See also Beasley, 495 
F.3d at 149 (discussing the importance of filing the 
information before trial); United States v. Ceballos, 302 F.3d 
679, 693 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that defendant‟s actual, 
pretrial knowledge that prosecutor intended to seek 
enhancement permitted imposition of the enhancement).
9
   
 
Nothing in the record indicates that Isaac had actual 
notice prior to trial.  During the colloquy regarding Isaac‟s 
request to proceed pro se, which did not occur until the close 
of the Government‟s case-in-chief, the Court briefly noted 
that the statutory maximum could be increased from twenty to 
thirty years because of Isaac‟s prior conviction.  The 
presentence report (“PSR”) unquestionably discussed the 
                                              
8
 The Government agrees that § 851‟s objective is “to give 
a defendant an opportunity to contest the accuracy of his prior 
convictions and to inform his decision on whether to plead 
guilty or proceed to trial.”  Appellee‟s Br. at 54 n.18. 
 
9
 At argument, the Government agreed that pretrial notice 
was key to fulfilling the purposes of § 851.   
12 
 
enhanced penalties, but, of course, the PSR was not created 
until after trial.  PSR ¶¶ 8, 149.  Thus, Isaac had no actual 
pretrial notice.  The only evidence of pretrial notice is the 
Government‟s assertion that “the prosecutor recalls that he 
provided Isaac with a Section 851 notice at a pretrial motions 
hearing.”  Appellee‟s Br. at 56.  However, the Government 
concedes that “it does not appear in the record.”  Id. 
 
Assuming the plain error standard applies in this case, 
the error here satisfies the plain error requirements because 
there is no record evidence that Isaac received pretrial notice, 
actual or otherwise, regarding the Government‟s intent to 
seek an enhancement.  Isaac was prejudiced because he was 
not so-informed and therefore was deprived of the 
opportunity to consider the effect of the enhancement on his 
decision to go to trial—a substantial right enshrined by 
Congress.
10
   
 
Our conclusion in this regard is buttressed by our 
characterization of the § 851 notice requirement in United 
States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2001).  There, we 
noted, in no uncertain terms, that “[t]he requirements set out 
in § 851 are mandatory and a district court may not impose an 
enhanced sentence unless the defendant has been notified of 
the „strikes‟ in compliance with these provisions.”  Id. at 246.  
Specifically, we noted that courts “continually emphasiz[e] 
the need for strict compliance with § 851(a)(1)‟s filing and 
service requirements,” because such requirements are 
“explicit in the statute.”  Id. at 247.  See also Severino, 316 
F.3d at 955 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he government‟s 
                                              
10
 We note that in addition to showing lack of actual 
notice, some courts have suggested that in order to satisfy the 
prejudice element of plain error review, a defendant must 
actually contest the validity of some of the prior convictions 
used to support the § 851 enhancement.  See, e.g., Dodson, 
288 F.3d at 162.  We are not convinced that such a showing is 
necessary given § 851‟s purpose of empowering the 
defendant to make an informed decision about whether to 
proceed to trial or plea, which may be affected particularly if 
the underlying convictions are valid.   
13 
 
failure to comply with the service provisions of § 851(a) 
deprived the district court of the authority to impose an 
enhanced sentence.  In exceeding its statutory sentencing 
power, the district court necessarily committed plain error and 
vacation of the sentence is required.”). 
 
Because we conclude that the error in this case 
affected the fairness of the proceeding, we exercise our 
discretion to vacate the 360 month sentences imposed on 
counts 3, 6, 9, and 11, drug distribution counts for violations 
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).  We direct the District 
Court on remand to impose the otherwise applicable statutory 
maximum sentence of 20 years on each of those counts.
11
  We 
are fully aware that this decision will not alter Isaac‟s overall 
sentence.  Nevertheless, § 851 is not merely hortatory; it is 
important to hold the Government to the congressionally 
imposed requirements.   
 
D. Other Sentencing Claims 
 
Isaac raises several other challenges to his sentence, 
none of which are meritorious.  First, Isaac contends that it 
was error under the terms of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) to impose 
the 10 year mandatory minimum sentence for possession of a 
firearm in furtherance of a drug crime (count 17) as a 
consecutive sentence to the life imprisonment sentence.  This 
argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court‟s recent 
decision in Abbott v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 18 (2010), 
affirming this court‟s decision rejecting this precise argument.  
The Court held, “that a defendant is subject to a mandatory, 
consecutive sentence for a § 924(c) conviction, and is not 
spared from that sentence by virtue of receiving a higher 
mandatory minimum on a different count of conviction.”  Id. 
at 23.   
 
Second, Isaac contends that two errors were made in 
calculating his criminal history points.  Because Isaac did not 
                                              
11
 This is the remedy Isaac seeks.  He does not contend 
that the Government‟s failure to comply with § 851 should 
result in a new trial.   
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object to the District Court‟s criminal history calculation, we 
review for plain error.  United States v. Russell, 564 F.3d 200, 
206 (3d Cir. 2009).  The PSR and the District Court 
concluded that Isaac had nine criminal history points, putting 
Isaac in criminal history category IV.  Isaac rightly contends 
that pursuant to Guideline § 4A1.2(d)(2)(A) he should have 
received only two points, instead of three, for a September 21, 
1999 drug offense that occurred when Isaac was only 15 
years old.  However, the error was completely harmless 
because even with the one point reduction, Isaac would 
remain in criminal history category IV and the same 
Guideline range would have applied.   
Isaac‟s argument that the District Court erred in adding 
one criminal history point pursuant to § 4A1.1(e) of the 
Guidelines is also without merit.  This provision required the 
addition of a point if the defendant committed the instant 
offense within two years of release from imprisonment (a so-
called “recency point”).  Last year, the Sentencing 
Commission deleted this provision, effective November 1, 
2010.  The Sentencing Commission did not make the 
amendment retroactive.  Under statute and our precedent, we 
do not have the authority to reduce a final sentence based on 
non-retroactive amendments.  United States v. Thompson, 70 
F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 1995).  There was no error here, plain 
or otherwise.   
 
Isaac contends that it was plain error for the District 
Court not to depart downward from criminal history category 
IV because it substantially overrepresents the seriousness of 
Isaac‟s criminal history.  Isaac never moved for a downward 
departure on this ground.  Even if he had, in contrast to 
determining whether a sentence is reasonable, appellate 
courts lack jurisdiction over the merits of a district court‟s 
discretionary decision not to depart downward from the 
Guidelines once it is determined that the district court 
properly understood its authority to grant a departure.  United 
States v. Minutoli, 374 F.3d 236, 239 (3d Cir. 2004).   
 
Finally, we reject Isaac‟s claim that the sentence was 
procedurally unreasonable.  Notwithstanding the severity of 
the sentence and the defendant‟s youth, the record 
15 
 
demonstrates that the District Court meaningfully considered 
all of the relevant § 3553(a) factors.
12
   
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of conviction on all counts.  We also affirm the sentence as to 
all counts except counts 3, 6, 9, and 11, drug distribution 
counts for violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).  
We vacate the sentences as to those counts and remand to the 
District Court to impose the otherwise applicable statutory 
maximum sentence of 20 years on each of those counts.  
 
 
                                              
12
 We also reject Isaac‟s argument, raised in his pro se 
supplemental brief, that the evidence was insufficient to 
support his CCE conviction.   
